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China’s Human Rights Footprint in Africa
TIMOTHY WEBSTER *
A significant amount of recent scholarship and commentary accuses China of plundering the African continent, coddling its dictators and flouting labor and
environmental standards. This Article makes the
counterintuitive claim that, despite irrefutable cases of
abuse, China’s engagement with Africa has actually
improved the human rights conditions of millions of
Africans. First, it places China’s abuses in context,
showing that they differ little from the abuses and patronage politics of the major Western powers. Second,
it examines the evolution of international relations between China and various African countries, from the
exportation of political revolution in the 1950s and
1960s, to the promotion of human capital in the 2000s
and 2010s. Third, it catalogs the many recent contributions in the educational, agricultural, infrastructural and medical fields that China has made to African
development. By challenging the dominant narratives
on both theoretical and empirical grounds, I call for a
reexamination of a critically important, but often misunderstood, pattern of interactions between China and
Africa, a nexus that is shaping world affairs and perceptions in unprecedented ways.

* Director of East Asian Legal Studies, and Assistant Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. I appreciate the comments and feedback from
participants at various conferences and seminars, including The New Scramble for Africa?
Contemporary Formations between Asia and Africa, Yale University, April 23, 2010;
Institute for African Development Seminar Series, Cornell University, April 21, 2011; and
Expanding Critical Spaces in International Law, Whittier Law School, March 23, 2012. I
owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor James Gathii for his insightful comments and
critiques of this Article. Finally, I would like to thank Dean Lawrence Mitchell of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law for generous summer research support.
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INTRODUCTION
China’s recent engagement with Africa has elicited copious
commentary from the West, much of it negative. International media, 1 think tanks, 2 NGOs, 3 bloggers, 4 academics, 5 government officials (elected and appointed), 6 international financial institutions 7 and
1. Howard W. French, The Next Empire, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 13, 2010, 9:00 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/05/the-next-empire/8018/.
French’s
account is relatively even-handed, but he too insists on likening China’s strategy to former
European colonial powers, in this case Germany. See id. More typical is The Economist,
which states “China is coddling dictators, despoiling poor countries and undermining
Western efforts to spread democracy and prosperity.” See The New Colonialists: China’s
Hunger for Natural Resources is Causing More Problems at Home than Abroad,
ECONOMIST (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.economist.com/node/10853534.
2. Princeton N. Lyman, China’s Rising Role in Africa: Presentation to the US-China
Commission July 21, 2005, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jul. 21, 2005), http://www.
cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436 (noting China’s new ties with “unstable” and
“political[ly] controvers[ial]” states such as the DRC, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe).
3. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INVESTING IN TRAGEDY: CHINA’S MONEY, ARMS, AND
POLITICS IN SUDAN (Mar. 2008), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/080311-cah-investing-in-tragedy-report.pdf.
4. Bloggers deploy a bit more nuance. See Andrew Leonard, China in Africa: Not
Playing Fair? Western Mining Companies Complain to Mommy About China’s Bad
Behavior, SALON (Jan. 29, 2007, 12:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2007/01/29/china_
mining/.
5. The proximate cause of this article was a 2010 address delivered by Robert
Rotberg of Harvard University in which he cataloged China’s actions in Africa.
6. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned of a creeping “new colonialism” in
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others have assailed China’s range of initiatives to invest, trade, arm,
train, loan, extract, sell, experiment or otherwise interact with Africa.
In the dominant discourse, China’s objectives in Africa are essentially exploitative, extracting the continent’s natural resources to feed
China’s edacious growth. Second, Chinese support for Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola, Guinea and other unsavory regimes abets poor governance. 8 Third, by degrading the people, land and water of Africa
through predatory labor practices, environmental destruction and violent suppressions, China is exporting its own worst practices to Africa. 9
Western analysts frequently maintain that China is colonizing
Africa. This overstates the case, I argue, and misapprehends both the
nature of China’s multifaceted relationships with fifty African countries, and the underlying meaning of its presence. It is not merely the
irony of London, 10 Paris, 11 Brussels or other former imperial powers
Africa from foreign investors, which was widely interpreted to refer to China. Matthew Lee,
Hillary Clinton Warns Africa of ‘New Colonialism’, HUFFINGTON POST (June 11, 2011,
12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/11/hillary-clinton-africa-new-colonial
ism_n_875318.html. According to leaked diplomatic cables, Assistant Secretary of State
Johnnie Carson wrote that China is a “pernicious economic competitor with no morals” and
“is not in Africa for altruistic reasons.” Susan Stumme, Leaked US Cable Says China has
‘no morals’ in Africa, AFP (Dec. 8, 2010), available at http://news.theage.com.
au/breaking-news-world/leaked-us-cable-says-china-has-no-morals-20101209-18r9a.html.
Former UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw listed China among the ten biggest challenges
facing Africa, next to poverty, terrorism and regional conflict. CANRONG JIN, BIG POWER’S
RESPONSIBILITY: CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE 118 (Tu Xiliang, trans., 2011).
7. World Bank President, and architect of the Iraq War in the Second Bush
Adminsitration, Paul Wolfowitz expressed concerns to the French media about China’s
ignoring human rights abuses and environmental degradation in Gabon, among other places.
See Paul Wolfowitz, ‘Il ne faut pas que la Chine commette les erreurs passées de la France
et des Etats-Unis,’[China does not need to commit the past errors of France and the United
States] LES ECHOS (Oct. 24, 2006), http://www.lesechos.fr/24/10/2006/LesEchos/19779-41ECH_--il-ne-faut-pas-que-la-chine-commette-en-afrique-les-erreurs-passees-de-la-france-etdes-etats-unis--.htm; World Bank President Attacks China over African Lending Practices,
IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT (Oct. 25, 2006), http://www.ihs.com/products/global-insight/industryeconomic-report.aspx?ID=106598789&pu=1&rd=globalinsight _com#.
8. Peter Godwin defines “politicide” as “the practice of wiping out an entire political
movement . . . . The murders here [in Zimbabwe] are accompanied by torture and rape on an
industrial scale, committed on a catch-and-release basis. When those who survive, terribly
injured, limp home . . . they act like human billboards, advertising the appalling
consequences of opposition to the tyranny.” Michiko Kakutani, Where Dissidents Are the
Prey, and Horror is a Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011, at C1. See also PETER GODWIN,
THE FEAR: ROBERT MUGABE & THE MARTYRDOM OF ZIMBABWE 43 (2010).
9. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE: HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER IS
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 163, 170–71 (2007).
10. See, e.g., Damian Grammaticas, Chinese Colonialism?, BBC NEWS (July 19,
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accusing Beijing of colonialism. 12 The PRC actively supported anticolonial movements in many African countries during the 1960s and
1970s. 13 Instead, such criticisms overlook both the historical dimension of Sino-African relations and the current emphases of the SinoAfrican nexus. China’s developmental assistance, military support
and terms of engagement hark back to the 1950s, but address Africa’s
contemporary concerns and needs in ways that the West has largely
overlooked.
The larger point, however, is that we simplify Sino-African
relations at our own risk. If we think China is simply draining Africa
of natural resources while buttressing its dictators, we ignore most of
China’s activity in Africa, including direly needed contributions towards Africa’s economic development. At the same time that Western countries and financial institutions dial back aid to Africa, China
is actually increasing its financial, agricultural and technical assistance. 14 In so doing, China has won plaudits from African dictators
2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-18901656; David Blair, Why China is Trying
Aug.
31,
2007,
http://www.telegraph.
to
Colonise
Africa,
TELEGRAPH,
co.uk/comment/personal-view/3642345/Why-China-is-trying-to-colonise-Africa.html; Conal
Walsh, Is China the New Colonial Power in Africa?, GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/oct/29/china.theobserver.
11. The French, perhaps more in touch with their own colonial past, prefer the term
neocolonialism (néo-colonialisme) to describe Sino-African relations. See, e.g., PHILLIPPE
RICHER, L’OFFENSIVE CHINOISE EN AFRIQUE [THE CHINESE OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA] 135, 148
(2008); Emmanuel Guérin, Bailleurs Emergents: Ou en Est La Chine en Afrique?
[Emerging donors:
Where in Africa is China?], 228 AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE
[CONTEMPORARY AFRICA] 105, 107 (2008).
12. It is problematic for Western powers to accuse China of “colonialism,” given
American, Belgian, French, British, Italian, German, Portuguese, Spanish and Dutch
colonialisms from the mid-seventeenth century to the late twentieth century. China, by
contrast, has not colonized any part of Africa. Unlike former colonial powers, China
actually pays for the resources it extracts, through infrastructure projects, cash, preferential
loans or other forms of payment. Indeed, it is tempting to make the counterfactual argument
that had the colonial powers actually invested in developing Africa’s infrastructure during
their centuries of colonization, China would have a much smaller presence in Africa right
now.
13. For example, China armed groups in Namibia, Zaire (the present D.R.C) and
Rwanda during the 1960s, and set up a guerilla training camp in Burundi. Warren
Weinstein, Chinese Aid and Policy in Central Africa, in SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO
AFRICAN NATIONS 145, 146–61 (Warren Weinstein & Thomas H. Henriksen eds., 1980). In
the 1970s, China armed a young guerrilla fighter named Robert Mugabe, and provided
assistance to UNITA in Angola. See Elias Isaac, The West’s Retreat and China’s Advance
in Angola, in CHINESE & AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 163, 163 (Axel
Harneit-Sievers et al. eds., 2010).
14. See Chen Jun, Xiong Zhengyi & Liu Hongpeng, Zhongguo Bujian Fanzeng Dui
Fei Yuanzhu Tisheng qi Fan Jingji Weiji Nengli [China Does Not Decrease, But Rather
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and democrats alike, from countries like resource-rich Sudan, but also countries without significant natural endowments like Mauritius
and Mali. 15 It is not just Robert Mugabe and Omar Al Bashir who
like the Chinese, but a host of democratically elected leaders, such as
former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, 16 President Paul
Kagame of Rwanda, 17 former President Abdoulayeh Wade of Senegal, 18 President Jacob Zuma of South Africa 19 and former President
Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi. 20
China’s support for despotic regimes must surely enter into
the discussion of its human rights footprint. But a more nuanced assessment of China’s presence in Africa must also include the hundreds of infrastructure projects, agricultural experiments, educational
facilities, pilot projects and other components of Beijing’s Africa policy. 21 Due attention to other areas illuminates the breadth of China’s
Increases, Its Assistance to Africa, Raising Its Ability to Weather the Economic Crisis],
XINHUA (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.qhnews.com/index/system/2009/02/20/002969211
6.shtml.
15. Id.
16. Prime Minister Zenawi has long criticized Western aid practices in Africa. But
when he paired criticism of the West with praise for China, it certainly captured the Chinese
media’s attention. According to China’s official news agency, the Prime Minister stated,
“We are very comfortable to see China’s increasing influence in Africa. So for Africa, the
influence of China is not a source of concern or danger. African countries are happy to see
the rise of China.” See Xiong Sihao, Ethiopian PM: China not looting Africa, XINHUA (Oct.
16, 2008, 6:18 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/16/content_5210162.htm.
17. President Kagame repeated Zenawi’s opprobrium for the West, and praise for
China. In an interview with a German newspaper, he said that “[t]he Chinese bring what
Africa needs: investment and money for governments and companies,” whereas Western aid
“has not brought Africa forward.” See China praised for African links, BBC NEWS (Oct.
11, 2009, 8:54 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8301826.stm.
18. See Communique: Hu Jintao Talks with President of Senegal Wade, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 23, 2006), http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t259893.htm.
19. See Cheng Guangjin & Wu Jiao, Zuma praises China’s Africa role, CHINA DAILY
(Aug. 26, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-08/26/content_11203
802.htm. President Zuma likewise played China off of the West: “China is there discussing
with the brothers and sisters in Africa to create a mutually beneficial kind of relationship . . .
different from former Western colonialists (simply) taking things by force.” Id.
20. Malawian president meets senior CPC official on relations, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Mar.
5, 2011, 9:57 AM), http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7308973.html.
Many on this list have also been characterized as “strong men,” not exactly steadfast
supporters of democratic institutions such as free and fair elections or independent courts.
But they did assume the reins of power through democratic elections.
21. China is, of course, a disaggregated entity, and thus the “Chinese presence” in
Africa actually refers to representatives of national ministries (Commerce, Foreign Affairs,
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engagement with Africa, generates insights into China’s “developmental diplomacy,” and elucidates the human rights implications of
China’s foreign policy. This Article attempts to move beyond mutual
recrimination by introducing Chinese perspectives into the discussion
of Sino-African affairs.
The goal is not to justify China’s presence in Africa—not that
such justification is necessary—but to reorient the discussion by using terminology and historical understandings familiar to China, and
the Global South more generally. It is misguided to assume all foreign countries approach Africa in the same way. Former colonial
powers like France, Britain, Italy and Portugal relate to African countries in ways that reflect their unique histories. For example, on the
eve of the Arab Spring, France offered to dispatch security forces to
prop up then-troubled Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, 22
revealing a paternalism deeply embedded in the former colonial relationship between the two countries. French airstrikes in Mali, conducted in response to a request from Malian President Traore, likewise indicated that the colonial past is less distant than perhaps once
thought. 23 Moreover, Italy hesitated to join the NATO bombing of
Libya, ostensibly because of its colonial ties, 24 more specifically to
protect both countries’ bilateral investments. 25
Education, Health, Agriculture), national banks (Exim bank), provincial-level infrastructure
companies, private entrepreneurs, laborers and a host of others. Unfortunately, the dominant
discourse still speaks of “China’s presence in Africa.” By and large, similarly expansive
language is not used to describe U.S. interactions with Africa. Discussions of the U.S.
presence in Africa tend to avoid ExxonMobil, McDonald’s or Starbucks, though each
operates in various African states.
22. French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie offered to send French security
forces to quell protests in Tunisia. She boasted of France’s “savoir-faire, recognized
throughout the world, of [French] security forces to settle security situations of this type.”
See Roula Khalaf & Scheherazade Daneshkhu, France Regrets Misjudgment Over Ben Ali,
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68bef0c2-232a-11e0-b6a3-00144feab
49a.html#axzz2Lrp8L9T2. One can only imagine the uproar that would greet a Chinese
offer to send security forces, even more famous than the French, to quell African riots.
23. The French airstrikes came significantly in advance of a UN-backed military
intervention, originally planned for September, 2013. Both the United States and United
Kingdom have supported the French military efforts. See Angelique Chrisafis et al., France
Launches Air Strikes on Mali, GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2013, 4:39 AM), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2013/jan/11/france-launches-airstrikes-on-mali (noting British support for
France’s “assistance to [the] Government of Mali”); France Pushes on with Mali Air
Strikes, GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2013, 2:37 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/15/
mali-french-air-strikes (describing U.S. support for French forces).
24. Italy to Take Part in Bombing Raids over Libya, FOX NEWS (Apr. 25, 2011), http://
www.foxnews.com/world/2011/04/25/italy-bombing-raids-libya/.
25. Libya’s sovereign wealth fund owns single-digit ownership interests in several
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China has no former colonies in Africa, but its current approach to fifty African countries reflects historical interactions, as
well as its own developmental needs. Injecting Chinese and Southern perspectives into the debate leavens the discussion, destabilizes
Western assumptions about Africa and highlights the ways that China
is exporting—and could do more to export 26—its own developmental
model to compete with Western ones. The emphasis on infrastructure, creation of special economic zones, interest-free loans and other
features characterize China’s own economic rise. At a time of
heightened fiscal tightness in the developed world, 27 China keeps
pouring investment, people and equipment into Africa. Perhaps it is
time to see if China can teach the West about working with Africa.
At the very least, we need to grapple seriously with the proposition
that China provides a meaningful, and increasingly popular, alternative to western sources of aid, expertise and developmental assistance.
This Article proceeds in four parts. The first part examines

large Italian corporations, such as Banca Roma, Fiat Motor Company and the Juventus
Football Club. Contrariwise, ENI—Italy’s largest oil company—has invested billions in
Libyan oil interests. Factbox: Italy and Libya Share Close Investment Ties, REUTERS (Feb.
20, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/20/us-italy-libya-factbox-idUSTRE71J1N
N20110220.
26. Professor Gathii points out that African countries could obtain additional benefits
from China’s presence if China engaged in technology transfer and skills training, and
opened its internal market to Africa exports. See James Thuo Gathii, Beyond China’s
Human Rights Exceptionalism in Africa: Leveraging Science, Technology and Engineering
for Long-Term Growth, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 664 (2013). While I agree with this, I
believe the initiative for seeking such advantages must be taken by the African leaders and
entrepreneurs who negotiate the contracts, or by African legislators who draft its foreign
investment laws. China promulgated its own laws and regulations in the 1980s to induce
transfer of advanced technology. See generally Paul B. Birden, Jr., Technology Transfer to
China: An Outline of Chinese Law, 16 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 413, 438–440 (1994).
Western countries did not hand over patent rights or production formulae out of beneficence,
but because Chinese law obliged them to do so.
27. Italy and France failed to make payments to a fund devised at the 2005 Gleneagles
Summit to target extreme poverty. By 2009, Italy had made only 3% of the necessary
payments, while France had lowered its aid during 2007 and 2008. Richard Lapper, Italy
and France draw fire for aid shortfall, FIN. TIMES (Jun. 11, 2009), http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/24db0e82-5620-11de-ab7e-00144feabdc0.html. In January 2011, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed a budget overhaul that cut $10 billion of funding for the
State Department and foreign aid, one-sixth of the total savings deducted from President
Obama’s latest request. David Rogers, House passes $60 billion in spending cuts, POLITICO
(Feb. 19, 2011, 5:23 AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=3D71F3B9-DD636416-88C6D047B8123F18.
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Chinese and Southern perspectives on human rights. 28 The second
part briefly surveys Chinese foreign policy objectives. The third part
examines China’s historical presence in Africa, and draws parallels
and contrasts with various types of Western engagement. The fourth
part examines the various ways that China promotes the human rights
and developmental needs of various African states. The methodology is thus mixed, coupling theoretical and historical approaches in
the first three parts with empirical observations in the final part. The
goal is to challenge the dominant theoretical discourse of SinoAfrican relations as developed in the West, based on a sound empirical footing.
I. CHINA’S VIEW OF HUMAN RIGHTS
To grasp the human rights implications of China’s engagement with Africa, we must first understand how China views human
rights. Though a dynamic concept that has modulated slightly over
the past two decades, China’s human rights platform has maintained
a basic consistency over time. 29 Two key concepts include emphasizing collective rights over individual ones, and privileging social
and economic rights over civil and political ones.
First, China emphasizes collective rights over individual ones.
This runs counter to core Western assumptions about human rights,
and the liberal democratic framework of international human rights
law (IHRL) more generally. 30 International human rights law, as
created after World War II, endows the individual with rights that he
may then deploy against national governments. This endowment
stems from the natural rights idea that humans enjoy certain entitlements simply by virtue of being people. 31 In other words, IHRL
serves to check governmental authority over the individual, ideally
ensuring a sphere of personal autonomy into which the state may not
28. The South here refers to less developed countries, or the “nations of Africa,
Central and Latin American, and most of Asia.” For a brief explanation, see Center for the
Global South, AM. UNIV., www1.american.edu/academic.depts/acainst/cgs/about.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2013). It is an oversimplification to group three-quarters of the world’s
countries under a single heading. But for present purposes, the South is a placeholder for the
viewpoints and values of these disparate nations.
29. See generally ANN KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SUBSISTENCE: CHINA AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1993).
30. Randall Peerenboom, Assessing Human Rights in China: Why the Double
Standard?, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 81 (2005).
31. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights as Natural Rights, 4 HUM. RTS. Q. 391, 391 (1982).
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intrude. 32
But the individual does not lie at the heart of Chinese society,
either presently or in traditional China. Like other Asian countries,
China stresses communitarian values, the importance of groups
within society and the state’s interests over those of the individual.
From a rights perspective, China would prefer to buttress the rights of
the entire community, rather than permit an individual to assert rights
against the state or community. 33 This tendency is surely changing
as greater individual autonomy bubbles up in contemporary China,
with important ramifications for asserting human rights. 34 But the
official Chinese view privileges the group at the expense of the individual, with important implications for foreign policy and the disbursal of foreign aid. Whereas Western donors may elect to fund a project to promote democracy, entrench human rights, support civil
society or enhance governance, 35 China would prefer to furnish the
basic subsistence needs of large groups of people. 36 Both Western
and Chinese sets of projects legitimately advance human rights, but
the divergent goals and methods of attaining those rights leads to
confusion and recrimination between China and the West.
Second, as a developing country run by a putatively communist state, the Chinese government and the majority of Chinese
scholars prioritize social and economic rights over civil and political
ones. 37 What does that mean? Social and economic rights include
32. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (6th ed. 2008) (“The view
adopted by the Western world with regard to international human rights law in general terms
has tended to emphasise the basic civil and political rights of individuals, that is to say those
rights that take the form of claims limiting the power of government over the governed.”);
Guyora Binder, Cultural Relativism & Cultural Imperialism in Human Rights Law, 5 BUFF.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 213 (1999) (international human rights treaties “reflect a liberal
individualism prevalent in the West, and ignore the importance of group membership, of
duties, and of respect for nature prevalent in many non-western cultures”).
33. See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF
COMPLIANCE 29–30 (1999) (exploring the traditional Chinese, socialist and Maoist roots of
China’s emphasis on collective and individual rights).
34. See generally Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism: Employment
Discrimination in China, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 643 (2011) (arguing that recent
employment discrimination lawsuits augur an important shift in rights consciousness, and
the use of litigation as a tool of social change, in contemporary China).
35. These are among the many projects supported by the United States Agency for
International Development. See Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, USAID,
http://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/democracy-human-rights-and-governance (last visited
Mar. 10, 2013).
36. See infra, Part IV.
37. ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: HISTORICAL
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the rights to work, education, employment, social security and basic
subsistence; food, clothing, water and housing attract significant attention and abundant resources under this rubric. 38 Like most communist countries, past and present, China posits the provision of its
citizenry’s material needs as a central function of government. For a
country of 1.3 billion people, that has proven no small feat. 39
Civil and political rights, on the other hand, refer to the rights
to vote, run for office, assemble, free speech, practice a religion of
one’s own choosing, receive a fair trial and so on. In the Chinese
conception, and in the Marxist tradition more generally, socioeconomic rights are the foundational human rights upon which civil and
political rights become possible. 40 Consequently, in the Chinese
conception, so long as China is still constructing its socioeconomic
foundation, discussion of civil and political rights is premature.
Scholars point out that these two sets of rights are not mutually exclusive; prioritizing one set over another is a Cold War anachronism
arising out of ideological differences between Western and Soviet
states. 41 That is true as an empirical matter, yet nations—including
the United States—continue to prioritize one set at the expense of the
other. 42 Yet many countries, including China and several African
& IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 25 (1999); JIN, supra note 6, at 127.
38. WEATHERLEY, supra note 37, at 24.
39. It is important to recognize that even “Western” financial institutions, such as the
World Bank, swoon over China’s poverty reduction statistics. According to the World
Bank, China lifted some 600 million people out of poverty from 1981 to 2004, accounting
for some 75% of the poverty reduction in the developing world. See Results Profile: China
Poverty Reduction, THE WORLD BANK (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.worldbank.org/
en/news/2010/03/19/results-profile-china-poverty-reduction.
40. As China’s First White Paper on Human Rights put it, in its first sentence, “the
right to subsistence is the most important of all human rights, without which the other rights
are out of the question.” I. The Right to Substistence—The Foremost Human Right The
Chinese People Long Fight for, CHINA.ORG.CN, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/7/7-I.htm
(last visited Mar. 10, 2013).
41. See MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 9–11 (1995)
(describing the Western preferences for civil and political rights and Soviet states’
preferences for economic, social and cultural rights).
42. One way to appreciate the difference between American and Chinese emphases on
rights is by comparing the poverty rates of the two countries. From 1980 to 2005, China
reduced the number of Chinese people in poverty by 80 to 90%. I have seen different
figures to describe this redistribution of wealth, but China lifted somewhere between 200
and 300 million people out of poverty in a generation. See, e.g., Anup Shah, Poverty Facts
and Stats, GLOBAL ISSUES (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.globalissues.org/article/26/povertyfacts-and-stats (discussing World Bank Development Indicators for China). In the United
States, by contrast, the poverty rate has hovered between 12 and 13% during this period,
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states, stress social and economic over civil and political rights. 43
More broadly, the South has promoted the “right to development,” a core of indivisible rights needed to assure the basic necessities of life. The 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development
charges states with ensuring that their people enjoy “access to basic
resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and
the fair distribution of income.” 44 Scholars focus on three rights in
particular—to food, to primary education and to health—as the bedrock upon which all other rights depend. 45 Once a person has acquired an education and achieved a level of health, the state can concern itself with providing employment, income, shelter and other
basic resources.
Fundamental though the right to development may seem, its
status as international law is far from assured. Developed countries
have long sought to neutralize or deny the existence of the right. The
United States voted against passing the Declaration in the UN General Assembly, while many other Western states abstained. 46 Nevertheless, the Declaration enjoys wide support among the developing
world, even as it lacks the broad international backing needed to
crystallize as a binding legal obligation.
One key disagreement involves against whom the right may
be claimed. The Declaration tasks states with providing for nationals
within their jurisdiction, as well as “the duty to co-operate with each
other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to develop-

while the absolute number has increased from twenty-eight to thirty-six million people. See,
e.g., National Poverty Center, Poverty in the United States: Frequently Asked Questions, U.
MICH., http://www.npc.umich.edu/poverty/#3 (last visited Apr. 12, 2013). In other words,
the United States has made little progress ensuring the socioeconomic rights of its populace,
while China has made progress the likes of which the world has never seen. On the other
hand, China has done little to safeguard the civil and political rights of its citizens, who do
not have free and open elections, the right to practice religion freely, the right to assemble
freely and so on.
43. See J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for
Economic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (“[G]overnments
in both countries have deemphasized the place of civil and political rights and focused on the
need for ‘development.’”).
44. Declaration on the Right to Development, art. 8, G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
45. See JOHN CHARVET & ELISA KACZYNSKA-NAY, THE LIBERAL PROJECT & HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF A NEW WORLD ORDER 145 (2008); Arjun Sengupta,
Right to Development as a Human Right, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 2527, 2530 (1999),
available at http://www.harvardfxbcenter.org/resources/working-papers/FXBC_WP7.
46. CHARVET & KACZYNSKA-NAY, supra note 45, at 139.
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ment.” 47 Moreover, states also have the “duty . . . individually and
collectively, to formulate international development policies with a
view to facilitating the full realization of the right to development.” 48
At least as a textual matter, then, a state may have obligations to
those beyond its immediate borders. Given most developed countries’ hostility to this claim, they are unlikely to cooperate, promote a
new international economy or collectively formulate development
policies for other states.
Where are developed countries to turn? One response would
be to each other. It is surely significant that the only international instrument enshrining the right to development is the 1981 African
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, making the right applicable
against African states. 49 And when those states are incapable of
providing the core elements of the right to development, presumably
other inclined states should step in to provide assistance. China,
then, can play a critical role in ensuring the right to development is
guaranteed in the Global South.
Western states’ disinclination to enshrine the right to development is not simply a matter of international law; it also shapes the
international financial institutions they oversee. As Anne Orford has
argued, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund—the
heart of the Washington Consensus—have long implemented policies
that actively thwart the right to development. Since 1986, the World
Bank has attached conditions to structural adjustment loans to require
the privatization of basic industries, and the liberalization of trade
and investment. 50 Other structural adjustment loans force governments to cut spending on health and education, lower the minimum
wage, produce goods for export (instead of satisfying domestic
needs) and deregulate the labor market. 51 These prescriptions arguably succeeded in certain developed countries, such as the United
States and United Kingdom, during the heyday of Reaganism and
Thatcherism.
But the neoliberal paradigm has not facilitated growth in

47. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 44, art. 3(3) (emphasis
added). See also African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 22, adopted June 27,
1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).
48. Id., art. 4(1).
49. Id.
50. Anne Orford, Globalization and the Right to Development, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
127, 149 (Philip Alston ed., 2001).
51. Id. at 151.
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many countries in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa. 52
While its record in East Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia is, on
the whole, more positive, that may be attributable to features of
Asian societies, rather than neoliberalism itself. 53 And of course, the
2008 financial crisis has punctured many myths about the desirability
of unregulated economic activity, and leaving the “invisible hand” to
correct errors and bottlenecks in the market.
In addition, China’s own rise has led many to reconsider the
conventional wisdom traditionally ascribed to neoliberal economics
and deregulation. The state has played the central role in China’s
economic rise, overseeing dramatic economic growth without precedent in human history. 54 The Chinese example provides an alternative narrative to how states and societies develop in the contemporary
period. Little wonder, then, that African leaders increasingly turn
their attention towards China in reevaluating the proper balance of
state intervention and private initiatives.
II. CHINESE VIEWS OF FOREIGN POLICY
To understand China’s current engagement with Africa, we
must also absorb the key features of China’s foreign policy. For half
a century, China’s diplomacy has abided by the “Five Principles,” a
platform first agreed upon by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Indian
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954. 55 They are:
1. mutual respect for the other country’s sovereignty;
2. mutual non-aggression;
3. mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs;
4. equality and mutual benefit;
5. peaceful coexistence. 56
In addition, during his 1964 visit to several African countries,
Premier Zhou Enlai articulated the “Eight Principles for Economic
Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries”, which include:
52. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 154 (2005).
53. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE WEST OR MODEL
FOR THE REST 26–31 (2005).
54. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 9
(2008) (China’s economic growth “has averaged 10 percent for the past 30 years, the most
stunning record in history”).
55. Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India,
Apr. 29, 1954, 299 U.N.T.S. 4307.
56. See id.
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1. equality and mutual benefit in providing aid;
2. no conditions for any privileges;
3. imposing the lightest possible burden on recipients;
4. help the country gradually achieve self-reliance;
5. aid projects require little investment but quick results;
6. provide best-quality equipment of its own manufacture;
7. ensure the recipient country masters new techniques;
8. Chinese experts cannot enjoy special amenities. 57
Principles two (non-conditionality) and five (quick results after small investment) are particularly important to the present discussion. Before examining these principles, however, it is important to
note their consistency over the past several decades. Since its founding sixty-plus years ago, China’s domestic situation has undergone
wild vicissitudes. From the Great Leap Forward (1959–61), where
tens of millions starved to death, to the Cultural Revolution (1966–
76), which terrorized generations of Chinese, to the reform period’s
pursuit of a semi-market economy (1978–present), the PRC has endured some of the most extreme and violent ideological, political,
economic and cultural swings of the twentieth century. Nevertheless,
the basic parameters of its foreign policy have remained intact for
most of the PRC’s history. 58 Its foreign policy has thus hewed to the
57. See Zhou Enlai Announces Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, CHINA DAILY (Aug.
13, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-08/13/content_11149131.htm; State
Council Information Office, Apr. 21, 2011, White Paper on China’s Foreign Aid, Appendix
I, http://www.eu-china.net/web/cms/upload/pdf/nachrichten/2011-04-21Chinas-ForeignAidWhitePaper.pdf.
58. Because of China’s relatively constant foreign policy, African leaders call China,
with perhaps exaggerated optimism, its “all-weather friend.” See, e.g., Mission of the
People’s Republic of China to the European Union, Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun Talks
about Vice President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Four Asian and African Countries (Nov. 24,
2010), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cebe/eng/zgwj/t772355.htm (noting that leaders of
Botswana called China an all-weather friend); China, Zambia’s all-weather friend: Zambian
former PM, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Aug. 30, 2006), http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/200608/30/eng20060830_298013.html (noting Zambian former Prime Minister
Malimba Masheke, after reciting China’s help in building roads, and a mass media complex
called China Zambia’s all-weather friend); Interview: COMESA Eyes Agricultural
Cooperation With China, PEOPLE’S DAILY (Oct. 3, 2000), http://english.peopledaily.
com.cn/english/200010/03/eng20001003_51778.html (noting former Secretary General of
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Erasmus Mwencha, said that China
has been an “all-weather friend” to Africa from decolonization to the present. Mwencha
repeated the comment as Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission in 2010);
Wei Tong, Feimeng Weiyuanhui Fuzhuxi Muwenzha Shengzan Zhongguo Shi Feizhou
Quantianhou Pengyou [Deputy Chairperson of the African Union Commission Mwencha
Praises China As Africa’s All Weather Friend], GUOJI ZAIXIAN ZHUANGAO [INTERNATIONAL
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same principles, more or less, since the 1950s. During his 1999 visit
to Africa, then-Vice President Hu Jintao stated “China will, as always, adhere to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.” 59 After becoming president, Hu Jintao has repeatedly referenced individual principles in speeches presented at Sino-African summits. 60
Compare this with the United States, where each new administration brings a new set of values, policies, diplomatic techniques
and personnel to conduct foreign affairs. In the past decade (2002–
2012) the outside world has seen two very different approaches to
foreign policy in the United States: the aggressive unilateralism of
the George W. Bush administration (2000–2008), followed by the
measured multilateralism of President Barack Obama (2008–
present). 61 Of course, other policy shifts can be seen by reviewing
past administrations’ approaches to foreign affairs.
To be sure, espousing principles and enacting them differ,
sometimes vastly. China has maintained a rhetorical stance that its
actions have not always mirrored. Take mutual non-interference.
China firmly believes that it should not, and will not, engage in activities that infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations. In return, it
does not permit other countries to interfere in its own internal affairs.
But throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China supported a wide array of
guerrilla movements in Africa. China actively supported guerrillas,
providing financial and materiel support to rebel groups in Zaire
(present-day D.R.C.), Malawi, Zimbabwe, Angola, Rwanda and
Burundi. 62 It would be silly to assert that such activities did not “interfere” in the internal affairs of these states. China tried to justify its
conduct by claiming to support anticolonial movements, and thus to
help African countries win their independence from various European states. Still, it is undeniable that, during its early history, the PRC
actively meddled in the internal affairs of African states.
More recently, China has scaled back the revolutionary rhetoric, but it continues its arms sales. The concern with inciting communist revolt has been eclipsed by finding new markets to export its
manufactures obtaining natural resources, and testing new technoloONLINE PROFILES] (Feb. 2, 2010), http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/02/02/3245s2748783.htm.
59. See Chinese Leaders on Sino-African Relations, CHINA.ORG.CN (Dec. 10, 2003),
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/China-Africa/82054.htm.
60. FOCAC summit issues declaration, XINHUA (Nov. 16, 2006), http://news.xinhua
net.com/english/2006-11/06/content_5295615.htm.
61. For example, President Bush invaded Iraq without receiving authorization from the
UN Security Council, whereas President Obama hesitated to invade Libya, preferring instead
for Britain and France to take the lead.
62. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 147–48.
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gies. Pragmatism has prevailed over politics. Of course, as the western media and NGOs have amply documented, China continues to
arm groups engaged in conflicts in Sudan, and to sell weapons to
Zimbabwe. 63 When Africans use guns, ammunition, tanks and jet
fighters manufactured in China, to wage battles against rebel forces,
or government armies, China indirectly interferes in other states’ internal affairs. 64 China may not have sold weapons directly to the
groups using them. 65 But that is the quandary of selling weapons to
places in unstable regions; arms change hands with astonishing frequency.
While China’s non-interference policy may not withstand
critical scrutiny, it does have important ramifications for international
trade and investment. Among other things, China does not inquire
into the domestic political situation of the partner country. If the
partner provides what China needs—oil, bauxite, copper, timber—
China cares little whether its government is democratic or dictatorial.
Unlike international financial institutions such as the World Bank,
China does not condition its aid, investment or trade packages on
pledges to improve governance, extirpate corruption or end human
rights abuses. This policy of realeconomik has led to denunciations
of Chinese support for some of Africa’s most notorious leaders, including Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan and
a handful of minor players—such as Moussa Didis Camara (former
dictator of Guinea) and Jose Eduardo dos Santos (president of Angola since 1979). 66
63. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 3 (cataloguing China’s arms sales to
Sudan).
64. See, e.g., Celia W. Dugger, Zimbabwe Arms Shipped by China Spark an Uproar,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/19/world/africa/19zimba
bwe.html (Even in the context of an arms sale to Robert Mugabe, one of Africa’s most brutal
dictators, the Chinese foreign minister stated, “[o]ne of the most important principles is not
to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries”).
65. The discovery of Chinese arms in areas such as the DRC, Somalia and Sudan does
not prove that China sold arms in violation of UN sanctions levied against these states. But
China has refused to cooperate with UN arms experts, perhaps shielding its own domestic
arms industry. See Colum Lynch, China’s Arms Exports Flooding Sub-Saharan Africa,
WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-25/world/3549165
9_1_arms-exports-chinese-diplomats-chinese-weapons.
66. The BBC cited President Dos Santos, who has ruled Angola since 1979, in its list
of richest corrupt rulers. While his net worth is unknown, President Dos Santos ranked
alongside Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea (a close United States ally), and Nursultan
Nazarbeyev of Kazakhstan (another close United States ally) as the top three current leaders
most enriched by graft. See Suharto tops corruption rankings, BBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3567745.stm.
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I will return to these countries later in the discussion, 67 but
here simply note that China’s support for unsavory African leaders
cannot be divorced from its broader network of relationships in Africa. Every African state that recognizes and maintains diplomatic relations with China (and not Taiwan) receives some kind of aid. 68
Thus, unlike France and Britain, which channel the vast majority of
their aid and assistance programs almost exclusively on former colonies, China works with everybody. 69 And while many criticize China’s collaboration with “the worst of the worst,” the United States
also provides assistance to such countries as Angola, Sudan and
Zimbabwe, in addition to forty-six other African states. 70
III. CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA
China’s engagement with Africa dates back to 1417, when
Chinese admiral Zheng He visited various African ports in the early
Ming Dynasty. Between 1405 and 1433, Zheng He led a total of
seven voyages, some including as many as 312 ships to Southeast
Asia, South Asia and eventually East Africa. 71 On the fifth voyage
(1417–1419), the fleet landed in Mogadishu, Mombassa, Zanzibar,
Madagascar and probably Egypt. Zheng He brought back interesting
souvenirs from his trip, including a giraffe, as a token of his travels.
But with Zheng’s death in Calcutta on the seventh voyage, the
era of Chinese maritime expedition ground suddenly to a halt. Speculation abounds as to why China—having set forth the largest overseas expedition in human history—abandoned this endeavor. Perhaps China had met its goals of extending its influence to distant
lands, proving its military capabilities, expanding Chinese knowledge

67. See infra, Part III.
68. DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA
278 (2009). As of December 2012, five African states recognize the Republic of China on
Taiwan: Burkina Faso, Lesotho, Gambia, Swaziland, Sao Tome and Principe.
69. The United Kingdom devotes 89% of its African aid to sixteen countries, twelve of
which are former colonies. See Alan Hudson, UK Aid to Africa: A Report for the UFJ
Institute, OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (Jan. 20, 2006), 16–18, http://www.odi.org.uk/
resources/docs/3693.pdf. In addition, Britain provides smaller amounts of aid to former
colonies such as Somalia, Eritrea, Namibia and Gambia.
70. USAID, Bureau for Africa, http://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/organization/
bureaus/bureau-africa (last updated June 7, 2012).
71. Barbara Bennett Peterson, The Ming Voyages of Cheng Ho (Zheng He), 1371–
1433, 16 GREAT CIRCLE 43, 44 (1994).
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of the world and incorporating more states into its tribute system. 72
Or perhaps threats closer to home occupied the Ming Dynasty’s attention. 73 Whatever the explanation, China turned its back on Africa
for the succeeding five centuries.
China’s neglect contrasts sharply with the more active involvement of early Europeans. The Portuguese conquered their first
African city in 1415 (Ceuta), captured their first slaves in 1441 (Cabo
Branco, Mauritani) and established Europe’s first slave-trading company in 1444 (Lagos, Nigeria). 74 The consequences of European exploitation, enslavement and extraction are well known at this point,
and do not require additional explication. Yet these historical origins
matter for contemporary relations between China and Africa on the
one hand, and the West and Africa on the other.
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, China maintained
more regular contact with Africa. Between 1956 and 1977—amidst
the internal chaos of the Great Leap Forward (1957) and Cultural
Revolution (1966–76)—the PRC provided an estimated $2.668 billion in economic assistance to African countries, approximately fiftyseven percent of its total foreign aid. 75 China supported not only its
ideological brethren experimenting with socialism, but states of all
political stripes: monarchies, dictatorships and democracies. China
provided aid to thirty-six African nations during this period, a broad
swath of the continent.
At this time, the largest recipients of Chinese aid were Tanzania and Zambia, most of which was spent constructing a 2000-km
railway discussed below. Other large recipients included Egypt, the
first African state to recognize the PRC, Somalia and Zaire, all of
which received over $100 million during these two decades. 76 While
not large by global standards, these sums are nonetheless impressive
in light of the fact that China was itself a developing country, unable
to feed its own population for several of these years. 77 China laid the
72. Id. at 46.
73. Id. at 44.
74. Claudia Rei, The Organization of Eastern Merchant Empires, 48 EXPLORATIONS IN
ECON. HIST. 116, 119, 123 (2011).
75. These figures come from a 1978 CIA Report, recently unclassified. See United
States Central Intelligence Agency National Foreign Assessment Center, Communist Aid
Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries 1978: A Research Paper, at 7,
available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_
0000499889.pdf [hereinafter CIA Report].
76. Id. at 8, 10.
77. FRANK DIKOTTER, MAO’S GREAT FAMINE: THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S MOST
DEVASTATING CATASTROPHE: 1958–1962 (2010) (estimating that 45 million Chinese died
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foundations for many of its current relationships in the 1960s, providing small amounts of military and financial aid to newly independent
states and guerrilla movements.
Chinese aid frequently took the form of small loans, spread
out over a period of up to ten years, to dozens of African countries. 78
China gave more foreign aid to Africa than Eastern European countries; indeed China outspent even the Soviet Union in many subSaharan states, 79 maximizing its influence by providing aid to a large
number of newly independent states, whatever their political ideology. A handful of former colonies shared China’s revolutionary fervor, and this revolutionary suffused a number of political pronouncements from this early period. 80 But China was no ideological
purist, providing aid to countries of vastly disparate political inclinations. During its first decades, the PRC spent the bulk of its foreign
aid in Africa, more or less ceding Latin America, the Middle East and
South Asia to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 81
In the immediate post-revolutionary period, China’s primary
political purpose in Africa was securing diplomatic recognition. A
young country born into the world with an ideologically opposed
twin brother on the island of Taiwan, China needed allies in a world
eager to contain it. The United States firmly opposed Chinese involvement in various international organizations, including the United Nations. 82 The isolation was exacerbated by the Sino-Soviet riff
in the early 1960s, leaving China more vulnerable to international
pressure. Since it was not a member of the United Nations until
1971, and not recognized by most countries during the 1950s and
1960s, China courted African countries to secure recognition of its
international status. In April 1955, Premier Zhou Enlai and Vice
Premier Chen Yi attended the Summit on Afro-Asian Solidarity in
Bandung, Indonesia, holding talks with leaders from various North
and Sub-Saharan African States: Egypt, Sudan, Libya, Liberia and
Ethiopia. 83 One year later, Egypt became the first country to enter
during the Great Leap Forward).
78. CIA Report, supra note 75, Table 5.
79. Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Yugoslavia topped the list of Eastern European
donors. Id.
80. BRUCE D. LARKIN, CHINA & AFRICA 1949–1970: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 175 (1971).
81. Id.
82. ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND
GLOBAL SECURITY 33 (2007).
83. LIU HONGWU & LUO JIANBO, ZHONGFEI FA ZHAN HE ZUO: LI LUN, ZHAN LUE YU
ZHENG CE YAN JIU [SINO-AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: STUDIES ON THE THEORIES,
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into diplomatic relations with the newly founded People’s Republic, 84 followed by Sudan (1958), Morocco (1958) and Guinea
(1959). 85 By 1965, China had secured diplomatic recognition from
eighteen African states. This number dipped to thirteen by 1970, as
Taiwan launched a diplomatic counter-offensive. 86 But by 1979, on
the eve of China’s reform, some forty-four African states recognized
China. 87
Zhou Enlai again visited Africa in 1964–65, 88 committing
$190 million in aid to seven African countries, including Algeria,
Egypt, Sudan and Tanzania. 89 To be sure, this is not a lot of aid by
comparison with Western powers. But as a developing country itself,
China was hardly positioned to offer more generous terms. Instead,
China made its aid count by providing acutely needed developmental
assistance in what I call the “five pillars” of China’s development
diplomacy: agricultural support (state farms, rice cultivation, chicken
breeding); light industry (factories, mills, industrial plants); power
plants (hydroelectric, coal); infrastructure (roads, highways, railways); medical support (doctors, nurses and medicines); and technical assistance (training, education). 90 These five pillars have been
a relatively stable strain of Sino-African relations for half a century.
From technical and public relations perspectives, the greatest
achievement of China’s Africa policy was the Tanzam Railway,
stretching 1,156 miles from landlocked Zambia to coastal Tanzania.
At a cost of just under half a billion dollars, China supplied much of
the labor, and an interest-free loan payable over thirty years, to the
governments of Tanzania and Zambia. At the time, the World Bank,
the United States and the United Kingdom had denied requests to
fund the project. 91 So, too, did the United Nations, the U.S.S.R. and
Canada. 92 Tanzania, born in 1964 from the conjunction of a former
STRATEGIES AND POLICIES] 175 (2011).
84. Id.
85. George T. Yu, Peking’s African Diplomacy, in CHINA: NEW FORCE IN WORLD
AFFAIRS 148, 150–51 (Irwin Isenberg ed., 1972).
86. Id. at 150.
87. LIU & LUO, supra note 83, at 175.
88. Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan, Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Somalia, Zaire, Tanzania
and Uganda.
89. Yu, supra note 85, at 150.
90. Id. at 154–58.
91. RICHARD HALL & HUGH PEYMAN, THE GREAT UHURU RAILWAY: CHINA’S
SHOWPIECE IN AFRICA 90 (1976).
92. George T. Yu, The Tanzania-Zambia Railway: A Case Study in Chinese Economic
Aid to Africa, in SOVIET AND CHINESE AID TO AFRICAN NATIONS 117, 122–23 (Warren
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British colony and an Arab island, had few allies among the more
powerful states. China stepped in to fill the void, generating goodwill among two newly liberated African states, while also gaining access to Zambia’s rich copper belt. This is part of the “mutual benefit” or win-win results that China has long touted as central to its
foreign policy.
Despite the impressive scale of the Tanzam railway, most of
China’s aid to Africa was spent on less grandiose projects. 93 China
spent the remaining two-plus billion dollars on smaller projects with
more localized influence. According to the CIA, China “had become
the African countries’ favorite donor in the early 1970s,” by funding
a wide assortment of infrastructure projects. 94 Projects included, but
were not limited to, (1) building a nuclear power plant and deepwater port in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott, and supporting
medical and agricultural projects in the country; 95 (2) constructing a
hydroelectric dam in Congo, and building related electrical capacity; 96 (3) resurfacing a road in Madagascar; 97 (4) building a hospital,
sports stadium, flour mill and ceramics plant in Rwanda. 98 In July,
1966, two months into the chaos of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution, China laid the foundation stone of the Friendship Textile
Mill in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, the largest fully-integrated textile
mill in East Africa at the time. 99 The mill presently operates through
a Sino-Tanzanian joint venture company, employing over one thousand Tanzanians. 100
Further afield—and China has made a point of sending experts, aid and equipment into the more remote regions of Africa—
China built dams, factories, a pharmaceutical plant in Tanzania and
other basic infrastructure to help provide basic subsistence for one of

Weinstein & Thomas H. Henriksen eds., 1980).
93. See CIA Report, supra note 75, at 19–27 (describing aid projects, funded by
various communist countries, in individual African countries).
94. Id. at 21.
95. Id. at 20.
96. Id. at 25.
97. Id. at 26.
98. Id.
99. Gail A. Eadie & Denise M. Grizzell, China’s Foreign Aid, 1975–1978, 77 CHINA
Q. 217, 219–20 (1979).
100. See Ching Kwan Lee, Raw Encounters: Chinese Managers, African Workers and
the Politics of Casualization in Africa’s Chinese Enclaves, 199 CHINA Q. 647, 652 (2009)
(noting the number of casual workers, at 869, had exceeded the number of full-time workers,
at 818).
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Africa’s least developed countries. 101 By 1970, China had provided
Tanzania with $250 million in aid, and by 1971, China did surpass
Britain in one respect, becoming Tanzania’s largest source of foreign
aid. 102 China made similar inroads throughout Guinea, building a
hydroelectric plant in Pita, a dam in Tinkisso, a refinery in Madionoula, in addition to railway construction and repair. 103 China also
assisted in agricultural development of an unspecified nature.
While this section has emphasized various types of subsistence projects, it is also important to recognize the breadth of Chinese
military support. For certain states, this support amounted to direct
meddling in internal affairs, again presenting a challenge to China’s
long-held self-conception as a state that does not interfere in other
nations’ business. Apart from the generation of goodwill, the Tanzam railroad and larger emphasis on critical infrastructure to politically isolated states presaged key aspects of China’s Africa policy:
providing basic necessities on relatively generous financial terms to
countries when no other institution or government will offer assistance. This preference has continued relevance in the present day.
Many contemporary commentators censure China’s support for rogue
states, 104 overlooking the fact that China occupied a similarly degraded position for decades.
Since the late 1990s, China has redoubled its activities in Africa across a wide spectrum of sectors. Many efforts have been reported in the Western media: arming the Sudanese military, 105 vetoing UN Security Resolutions against Zimbabwean President Robert
Mugabe, 106 shooting miners in Zambia, 107 or supporting kleptocra101. LARKIN, supra note 80, at 97–98.
102. Yu, supra note 85, at 154.
103. LARKIN, supra note 80, at 98.
104. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
105. See China defends arms sales to Sudan, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2008),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7258059.stm (describing remarks by China’s special
envoy on Darfur that China accounts for 8% of Sudan’s arm imports, and that the United
States, United Kingdom and Russia also export arms to Sudan).
106. See Maggie Farley, Russia, China veto move to sanction Zimbabwe regime, L.A.
TIMES (July 12, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/12/world/fg-zimbabwe12.
107. See Barry Bearak, Zambia Uneasily Balances Chinese Investment and Workers’
Resentment, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/africa/
21zambia.html?pagewanted=all (noting that two Chinese mine managers wounded thirteen
Zambian miners after hundreds of angry coal miners rushed a locked gate); Barry Bearak,
Zambia Drops Case of Shooting by Chinese Mine Bosses, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/world/africa/05zambia.html (noting that Zambian
prosecutors had dropped the case against the two Chinese supervisors). Of course, this
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cies in Angola. 108 But China’s presence in Africa extends far beyond
the conflict-ridden regions of Zimbabwe and Sudan, and the resource-rich areas of Zambia and Angola.
In 2000, China initiated the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), a multifaceted intergovernmental mechanism to promote development and strengthen ties between China and those African states that recognize the PRC. Since that time, triennial
ministerial meetings in Beijing and various African capitals (Addis
Ababa, Cairo), coupled with annual and biannual meetings between
lower level officials, has enhanced Sino-African trade, investment
and mutual comprehension. 109 Bilateral trade between China and Africa has grown eighty-fold in over a decade, from two billion dollars
in 1999, to $160 billion in 2012.110 Chinese foreign direct investment into Africa, though notoriously difficult to track, also appears to
have skyrocketed. Between 1996 and 2007, the amount of FDI also
increased eighty-fold, from fifty-six million dollars to $4.46 billion. 111 While these are not vast sums—either in terms of China’s total outward investment, or Africa’s inward investment—they do suggest the large increases in economic activity between China and
Africa in the recent past.
Sino-African relations have evolved over the past six decades.
Early ties between the continent and China grew out of China’s
linked desires to win diplomatic recognition from members of the international community, and to support nascent anti-colonial movements. Small independent states, while not significant political actors on the global stage, cast votes at the UN General Assembly, and
echoes a 2005 incident, when an explosion at the Chinese-owned and -operated Chambishi
mine killed forty-eight Zambian miners.
108. See generally Elias Isaac, The West’s Retreat and China’s Advance in Angola, in
CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 163, 165–66 (Axel HarneitSievers et al. eds., 2010) (“For the majority of Angolan citizens the Chinese presence is very
problematic. It is seen as neocolonialism in which the ruling political elite sold the country
to Chinese capital without any consideration of the need to protect national interests. But the
ruling political elite sees it differently. They see it as an opportunity to obtain hard cash for
the reconstruction of the devastated infrastructure for which payments are made with raw
materials such as oil and fish.”).
109. See FOCAC ABC (May 21, 2012), www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ltjj/t933522.htm.
110. Center for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, Policy Briefing, FOCAC:
Trade, investment and aid in China-Africa relations, at 1 (May 2012), available at
http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/FOCAC_Policy-Briefing_tradeinvest_
final.pdf.
111. Mary-Francoise Renard, China’s Trade and FDI in Africa, 18, (African
Development Bank Group, Working Paper No. 126, May 2011), available at
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Working%20126.pdf.
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China was able to wrest the UN seat from Taiwan in 1971 in no small
part due to close connections with dozens of African countries. China’s relationships with African states of various stripes hark back to
this era. And of course China itself struggled to win international
recognition among the international community. Its current support
for “rogue” states—a term understood best from the eye of the beholder—stems from connections first cultivated decades ago.
IV. SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHTS IN AFRICA
The remainder of this Article examines the human rights implications of China’s presence in Africa. Given the above articulation of China’s human rights concerns, the focus will be on programs
to entrench socioeconomic rights of African people. In the past several decades, China has implemented hundreds of projects in nearly
every African country: building hydropower plants and railroads,
training medical personnel and students, paving roads, building ports
and so on. In so doing, China has helped raise the living standards,
and entrench the socioeconomic rights, of millions of Africans.
Before turning to these forms of assistance, it is important to
note that China would probably not use the language of entrenching
human rights to describe its presence in Africa. In surveying Chinese
scholarship on Sino-African relations, the issue of human rights rarely comes up. When it does, it often responds to abuses chronicled by
Western journalists, scholars and academics. 112 This is in part because “human rights” is still a sensitive term in Chinese diplomacy,
given the decades of accusations leveled against China for its own
human rights abuses. Prolonged censure has led China to tread carefully on this issue, particularly in the international arena. Generally
speaking, China hesitates to call attention to other countries’ human
rights abuses, unless of course that country has already criticized
China’s own record. 113

112. See, e.g., JIN CANRONG, BIG POWER’S RESPONSIBILITY: CHINA’S PERSPECTIVE 115–
121 (RENMIN UNIVERSITY PRESS 2010). Professor Jin notes various criticisms from the
West, but counters them by noting China’s foreign aid, economic cooperation, trade,
capacity-building endeavors, infrastructure projects and so on. Notably, he avoids the term
“human rights” in this analysis.
113. China is largely reluctant to criticize other countries’ domestic situations. But
China has responded to the United States Department of State’s annual summary of other
countries’ human rights records by publishing the “U.S. Human Rights Record” every year
since 2000. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, U.S. Human Rights Record in 1999,
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/ppflg/t36620.htm.
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During its own three decades of reform and opening up, China—like many other East Asian countries before it—has prioritized
economic development over other forms of human development.
More concretely, China has privileged feeding, housing, clothing,
educating and providing for the basic subsistence of its citizenry,
over environmental concerns, workplace safety, food safety and so
on. On the one hand, this has led to one of the greatest economic
success stories in world history, and the epochal lifting of hundreds
of millions of people out of poverty. 114 On the other, China has also
achieved more dubious accolades, such as surpassing the United
States as the world’s leading producer of carbon dioxide, 115 leading
the world in deaths attributable to mining accidents 116 and executing
more prisoners “than the rest of the world combined.” 117
China’s conduct in Africa reflects the prioritization of socioeconomic rights over other types of human development. By targeting trade, investment, infrastructure, education and agriculture, China
is trying to replicate in Africa various aspects of its own domestic
economic transformation. At the same time, the lax environmental
and labor standards by which Chinese companies operate in Africa
unfortunately replicate the lax environmental and labor standards
practiced at home. In other words, the African implementation of the
China model may raise living standards for some, while simultaneously depressing the quality of life for others.
China’s conduct in Africa differs from the West in other ways
as well. Unlike Western aid projects—whether from G-8 countries
or international financial institutions (IFI)—China does not attach
strings, or “conditionalities,” to its development packages, whether
in the form of improved governance indicators, better economic
management, a particular ideology, improved human rights record or
otherwise. The refusal to incorporate conditions, frequently criticized in the West, is not exactly a new paradigm for China. Julius
Nyerere, Tanzania’s first democratically elected president, described
China’s financial support for the Tanzanian-Zambian railroad in 1974
in the following way: “The Chinese people have not asked us to be114. See supra note 39.
115. Richard Black, China ‘Won’t Follow US’ on Carbon Emissions, BBC NEWS (Oct.
25, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-15444858 (noting China’s
emissions surpassed the United States, but per capita emissions are still lower).
116. Mark Gregory, Why Are China’s Mines So Dangerous?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-11497070 (noting that China accounts for 80% of the
world’s mining deaths).
117. Mark McDonald, China Said to Execute Thousands in ’09, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/31/world/asia/31execute.html?_r=0.
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come communists in order to qualify for this loan . . . . They have
never at any point suggested that we should change any of our policies—internal or external.” 118 Indeed, Nyerere would later single out
conditionality as one of the primary evils inflicted by IFIs on developing countries. 119
Decades later, China’s ideological agnosticism appeals to
many African states, not just those countries that have fallen afoul of
Western standards of good governance and human rights, but also
those that simply do not want to be preached to. The last point suffuses Chinese scholarship on this issue, namely that China’s relationship with Africa is “win-win,” that China is Africa’s “all-weather
friend” and that its assistance represents South-South cooperation.
China ostensibly sidesteps the paternalism of Western financial institutions and donor countries by approaching Africa as a classmate
(one hesitates to use the word “equal” given China’s enormous economic clout vis-à-vis individual African countries), instead of a
taskmaster. While IFIs have dictated the rules of engagement, often
without significant input from African stakeholders, China has not
unilaterally promulgated one formula to cure Africa’s myriad developmental ailments.
China’s economic engagement with Africa is a complex topic
on which entire books have been written. 120 Four points are especially salient to the discussion of human rights: the emphasis on infrastructure, medical services, education, and food and water. Western
aid programs have either overlooked these areas, 121 or retreated in the
118. Paul Opoku-Mensah, China and the International Aid System: Transformation or
Cooptation?, in THE RISE OF CHINA AND THE CAPITALIST WORLD ORDER 71, 82 (Li Xing ed.,
2010).
119. See Julius Nyerere, An Address, 17 DEV. AND CHANGE 387, 393 (1986).
120. Probably the most balanced accounts in English are DEBORAH BRAUTIGAN, THE
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009) and the collected volume
CHINESE AND AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Axel Harneit-Sievers et al. eds.,
2010). Somewhat less balanced are IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA (2009) and
PHILIPPE RICHER, L’OFFENSIVE CHINOISE EN AFRIQUE [THE CHINESE OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA]
(2008). Only a handful of Chinese books have addressed Sino-African relations. The best I
have come across is LIU HONGWU & LUO JIANBO, ZHONG FEI FA ZHAN HE ZUO: LI LUN, ZHAN
LUE YU ZHENG CE YAN JIU [SINO-AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: STUDIES ON THE
THEORIES, STRATEGIES AND POLICIES] (2011). A number of students at such Chinese
universities as Yunnan University and Zhejiang Normal University have written Master’s
theses on the topic in the years 2008 to 2011, suggesting that more Chinese scholarship is
probably forthcoming.
121. For example, the World Bank insisted throughout the 1980s and 1990s that African
users pay for health and education services, despite the obvious fact that many Africans
could not afford them. This led to a decline in access to health services in many countries,
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recent past. 122 Yet each facet is essential to the continued development of Africa, and the realization of basic socio-economic human
rights.
A. Infrastructure
There is no human right to infrastructure per se. But international human rights law guarantees a number of rights that hinge directly on functional infrastructure and the benefits that flow from the
ability to move goods, people and resources around a country. Some
60 years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized
“the right to a standard of living adequate for . . . health and wellbeing . . . including food, clothing, housing and medical care and
necessary social services.” 123 The International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which China has ratified) recognizes “the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living,” to include food, clothing, housing and “the continuous improvement of
living conditions.” 124 Likewise, the 1986 Declaration of the Right to
Development stresses the “constant improvement of the well-being
of the entire population” and the “fair distribution of the benefits resulting therefrom,” to be achieved through international cooperation. 125 To be sure, no covenant mentions power plants, highways,
railways and the like. Yet it would be difficult to deliver medical and
social services, or to attain the fair distribution of benefits, without a
fairly large network of roads, trains and airports.
China has helped build and repair roads, trains, ports, fiberoptic cables and other channels to aid the flow of information, goods
and people all across Africa. China has invested in the building of
schools, hospitals, offices, health-care centers, malaria prevention
centers and other facilities to improve the health and developmental
capacity of Africans. In 2007, China provided over 3 billion dollars
to construct ten hydropower plants in Nigeria, Sudan and other places. 126 In 2007, China also launched a satellite for the Nigerian govwith concomitant ill effects on health (e.g., rises in infant mortality rates), and significant
erosions in government spending on education. See JONATHAN GLENNIE, THE TROUBLE WITH
AID: WHY LESS COULD MEAN MORE FOR AFRICA 42–44 (2008).
122. See Results Profile: China Poverty Reduction, supra note 39.
123. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1), G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
124. International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, art. 11(1), Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
125. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 44, art. 2(3).
126. Vivien Foster et al., The World Bank, Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as
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ernment, which will boost broadcasting, phone and internet capabilities throughout the continent. 127
A significant portion of China’s assistance aims to provide
basic infrastructure and other public goods: roads, railways, power
plants and so on. Such assistance materially improves the lives of
ordinary Africans by accelerating the delivery of food, clothing, medicines and other necessary products to remote corners of the continent. At the same time, it eases the flow of goods and natural resources produced in Africa to markets in the continent and around the
world. By one estimate, China has engaged in 519 projects in Africa,
laying down some 3,000 kilometers of road and 2,000 kilometers of
railroads. 128
The construction of roads may seem distant from the human
rights agenda, but it can in fact be considered a pressing human rights
concern. Basic infrastructure is critical to human development, and
Africa sorely lacks such roads. 129 South Sudan, Africa’s newest
country occupying a territory roughly equivalent to that of France,
contains fewer than 100 kilometers of roads. 130 Many African countries face similar deprivation. In an amusing, if dispiriting, report by
The Economist, a 370-mile journey from Douala, Cameroon to the
interior city of Bertoua took the correspondent four days, instead of
Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa, Executive Summary, 3–4 (2008),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/BB_Final_Exec_summary_Engli
sh_July08_Wo-Embg.pdf.
127. See China launches Nigerian satellite, BBC NEWS (May 14, 2007, 8:31 AM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6653067.stm.
128. Liu He & Qiu Jun, Zhongguo Qieshi Bangzhu Feizhou Yingdui Weiji, Jiang Jixu
Tuidong Feizhou Fazhan [China Effectively Helps Africa Weather the Crisis: Will Continue
to Promote African Development], XINHUA (Mar. 1, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/
fortune/2009-03/02/content_10926691.htm. The precise length of roads and railroads that
China has helped build in Africa is difficult to measure. During the 2009 FOCAC meeting,
Premier Wen Jiabao said China had helped Africa build 2,200 kilometers of roads and 3,300
kilometers of railways. China Comes to Help Africa with Aid and Whole Heart: Chinese
Premier, XINHUA (Nov. 9, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/09/content_12
413099.htm.
129. See Michael Fleshman, Laying Africa’s Roads to Prosperity: The Continent
Targets Its Infrastructure Gap, 22 AFRICAN RENEWAL 12, 16 (2009) (“Africa has only about
25 per cent of the paved road per kilometre found in other low-income regions and an eighth
of the electricity-generation capacity per person.”); Piet Buys et al., Development Research
Group, World Bank, Road Network Upgrading and Overland Trade Expansion in SubSaharan Africa, 44–47 (2006) (noting that poor transport infrastructure, including a lack of
functional roads, has contributed to poverty in many Sub-Saharan African countries).
130. South Sudan’s Future: Now for the Hard Part, ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/18070450.
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the twenty hours originally planned. 131
In light of the infrastructural challenges facing Africa, Chinese investment plays an increasingly vital role. 132 One notable
state-owned enterprise is the China Road and Bridge Corporation
(CRBC), which has been active in twenty African countries since the
1960s. 133 While aggregate statistics are not available, individual
sources reveal the scope of CRBC’s footprint in Africa. In Kenya,
CRBC has constructed over 1,000 kilometers of roads since 1985.134
Its most famous project in East Africa is a section of road that links
Nairobi, Kenya’s political and economic capital, to Mombasa, its
main port. Known locally as the “China Road,” it receives plaudits
from Kenyan drivers as the “best road in Kenya and even in East Africa.” 135 The CRBC has also built the Addis Ababa Ring Road in
Ethiopia. Other Chinese companies include the China Railway Seventh Group, active in half a dozen African nations, including its least
developed. 136 It has built, or plans to build, substantial roads in Tanzania, Ethiopia, Zambia and Botswana. 137
131. Trucking in Cameroon: The Road to Hell Is Unpaved, ECONOMIST (Dec. 19,
2002), http://www.economist.com/node/ 1487583.
132. China has signed bilateral investment treaties with twenty-six African countries.
While some accuse China of structuring its BIT program to favor outbound investment at the
expense of inbound investment, this is not uncommon among developing countries or other
capital-exporting states. See Leon Trakman, University of New South Wales Centre for
Law, Markets & Regulations, Enter the Dragon IV: China’s Proliferating Investment Treaty
Program, http://www.clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/deterrence/public-v-private-enforcement/ent
er-dragon-iv-chinas-proliferating-investment-treaty-program.
133. See China Road and Bridge Corporation, CHINA RADIO INT’L (Oct. 14, 2010,
9:00:23 PM), http://english.cri.cn/7146/2010/10/14/2041s599399.htm.
134. Michael Chege, Economic Relations between Kenya and China, 1963–2007, in
U.S. AND CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA: PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING U.S.-CHINA-AFRICA
COOPERATION 12, 26 (J. Stephen Morrison ed., 2008), available at http://csis.org/files/media/
csis/pubs/080711_cooke_us_chineseengagement_web.pdf.
135. Id.
136. Ishmael Kindama Dumbuya, President Koroma Hands Over $30m Road Project to
China Railway Seventh Group, STANDARD TIMES PRESS, http://standardtimespress.org/?
p=1330 (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). The article lists road projects in Sierra Leone, Mali and
Guinea, which are among the world’s least developed states. For country-specific statistics
on human development, see the United Nations Development Program’s International
Human Development Indicators, available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics (ranking
Guinea as 178th, Mali as 182nd and Sierra Leone as 177th out of 187 states).
137. Yang Xuesong, Zhongguo Canyu Feizhou Gonglu Jianshede Xianzhuang yu
Qianjing [The Current Status and Prospect of China’s Participation in African Road
Construction], 6 GUOJI SHICHANG [INT’L MARKET] 66, 67 (2010). Yang mentions China
Railway’s plan to build a 118-km road in Ethiopia, two long roads in Tanzania (sixty
kilometers and eighty-five kilometers respectively), a forty-eight kilometer road in
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B. Medicine
International law makes access to health care a fundamental
human right. The ICESCR recognizes the “right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health,” 138 and more specifically, ensures the “creation of conditions
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in
the event of sickness.” 139 Many African countries struggle to provide needed medical services to their citizens, and hence secure this
human right. To use the language of the Declaration of the Right to
Development, by providing decades of medical assistance to various
African countries, China is fulfilling its “duty to co-operate with
each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development.” 140
China has provided medical assistance in various forms to Africa for half a century. In 1963, China dispatched its first team of
medical doctors abroad to work in the recently liberated former
French colony of Algeria. 141 Since that time, Algeria has benefited
tremendously from China’s overseas assistance. In December 1978,
the Chinese government sent over a specialized team to treat Algerian President Houari Boumedienne. 142 By 1995, a dozen Chinese
teams, employing 183 people, had completed one or two-year missions in Algeria. 143 At present, Chinese medical teams can be found
in Algiers, Annaba, Setif, Batna, El Kala and other major Algerian
cities. 144 The capital also boasts an acupuncture clinic staffed by
Chinese doctors. 145
But Algeria is the tip of the iceberg. Since the 1963 mission,
China has dispatched 17,000 medical personnel to forty-eight African
nations, treating some 200 million Africans. 146 Presently, over 1,000
Botswana, as well as various upgrades.
138. ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 12.
139. Id., art. 12(d).
140. Declaration on the Right to Development, supra note 44, art. 3(3).
141. HU JINSHAN, FEIZHOUDE ZHONGGUO XINGXIANG [AFRICAN IMAGES OF CHINA] 197
(2010).
142. Id. at 198.
143. Id. at 197.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Ronald Ssekandi, China’s Medical Aid Benefits 48 African Countries, XINHUA
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-02/22/c_131423681.htm;
Li Anshan, Zhongguo Yuanwai Yiliaodui de Lishi, Guimo jiqi Yingxiang [Chinese Medical
Teams Abroad: Their History, Scope and Influence], WAIJIAO PINGLUN [FOREIGN AFFAIRS
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Chinese citizens in fifty medical teams serve in forty African nations,
including surgeons, internalists, gynecologists, anesthesiologists and
practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine. 147 Chinese doctors
practice not only in major cities like Algiers and Dakar, but also in
some of the most underserved areas of Africa. 148 While many Western doctors stay close to the wealthier or more comfortable urban areas, Chinese doctors serve the poorest regions in Africa, such as Lumina, Democratic Republic of Congo, 149 Labe, Guinea, 150 or Jinja,
Uganda. 151 Indeed, many Chinese teams provide the only medical
treatment available in many parts of the continent. 152
In addition to sending medical personnel, China has also
spent considerable sums to build permanent physical structures in Africa. China has built or helped build thirty hospitals in various African countries, 153 including the Central African Republic, GuineaBissau and Chad. 154 Such facilities further expand local people’s access to medicine, an issue that continues to plague millions of Africans. China has also built thirty malaria prevention centers, and
pledged 500 million renminbi (roughly eighty million dollars) of anti-malarial drugs and equipment to various African countries. 155
REVIEW] (Jan. 2009), at 25, 32.
147. See HU, supra note 141, at 198; see also Embassy of the People’s Republic of
China in the Republic of Botswana, Implementation of Follow-up Actions of the Beijing
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, http://bw.china-embassy.org/eng/
xwdt/t461546.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
148. See CTR. FOR CHINESE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF STELLENBOSCH, EVALUATING
CHINA’S FOCAC COMMITMENTS TO AFRICA AND MAPPING THE WAY AHEAD (Jan. 2010),
available at http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/ENGLISH-EvaluatingChinas-FOCAC-commitments-to-Africa-2010.pdf. This valuable report attempts to monitor
China’s progress on meeting its various commitments to African countries announced at the
triennial Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
149. HU, supra note 141, at 199.
150. Hu Yongqi & Cui Jia, Chinese Medical Teams Kindle Hearts in Guinea, CHINA
DAILY (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/22/content_113377
20.htm.
151. HU, supra note 141.
152. Id. at 198.
153. Lu Hui, President Hu: Important Progress Made in Realizing China-Africa New
Strategic Partnership, XINHUA (July 19, 2012), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/
2012-07/19/c_131725431.htm.
154. State Council Information Office, White Paper: China’s Foreign Aid, CHINA
DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-04/22/content_12373944.htm (last updated
Apr. 22, 2011).
155. See Interview with His Excellency Mr. Gu Xiaojie, Ambassador of China, on SinoAfrica and Sino-Ethiopia Cooperation in Fighting Malaria, EMBASSY OF THE PEOPLE’S
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Support for malaria is especially valuable, as it kills one million African children every year, and infects hundreds of millions of Africans. 156 China also sends teams to educate African medical workers
on the prevention and diagnosis of malaria. 157
C. Education
Education has been a central plank of the human rights platform for the entirety of the postwar period. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though not binding, proclaimed that elementary education should be free and compulsory, and higher education
should be “equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.” 158 Later,
the ICESCR recognized “the right of everyone to education,” and
bound states parties to provide free and compulsory primary education, “generally available” secondary education and higher education
that is equally accessible to all. 159 Despite these guarantees, it is unclear how many Africans actually enjoy this right. A lack of qualified teachers, classrooms and learning materials has conspired to
make primary school enrollment in African countries “among the
lowest in world.” 160
One of the keys to China’s own rise, particularly in the past
decade, has been its investment in education. In Africa, too, China
stresses the importance of education and training in its assistance
programs. Across the continent, China has built over 100 schools,
and established twenty-nine Confucius Institutes in twenty-two countries. 161 The latter propagate Chinese culture, but also provide instruction in Mandarin, fast becoming the world’s second lingua franca after English. Chinese and African universities have also entered
into cooperative agreements to facilitate the exchange of ideas and
research. China has paid special attention to higher education,
providing an eighty million dollar loan on favorable repayment
terms, and a significant amount of labor and materials, to Malawi to

REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA (Mar. 17, 2011),
http://et.china-embassy.org/eng/zagx/t807396.htm.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. UDHR, supra note 123, art. 26(1).
159. ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 13(1), 13(2)(a)–(c).
160. African Education Initiative, USAID, http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/subsaharan_africa/initiatives/aei.html (last updated Dec. 30, 2011).
161. See Lu, supra note 153.
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build a University of Science and Technology. 162
China has also contributed to the human development of African people. In its half-century of bilateral relations, China has
trained some 40,000 Africans across various sectors, and provided
scholarships to 20,000 Africans to study in the PRC. 163 The number
of scholarships has increased gradually in the past several years, from
2,000 in 2006, to 5,500 in 2012. 164 China has recently reduced the
number of undergraduate scholarships available to African students,
and raised the number for master and doctoral studies. 165 These
funds help ensure an important sector of the African elite understands, and perhaps feels some gratitude towards, China. That is,
such initiatives capture both minds and hearts.
D. Food and Water
As noted above, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the ICESCR both guarantee the right to an adequate standard of
living, and specifically provide for the right to food. 166 The right to
water has a far more recent provenance, recognized only in 2010,167
even as water is obviously vital to the creation, sustenance and propagation of life itself. Despite their status as fundamental human
rights, however, food and water elude millions of Africans; obtaining
sufficient quantities of both has long proven an intractable problem.
This condition is frequently exacerbated by drought, war, corruption
and the difficulties of coordinating responses by the international
community. One million Ethiopians died in 1984, and major famines
have recurred in African countries from Angola and Malawi to So-

162. Clemence Manyukwe, Malawi:
China to Fund New Science University,
UNIVERSITY WORLD NEWS (June 6, 2010), http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?
story=20100605065149374; Malawi: President Donates Land for Science University, FACE
OF MALAWI (Apr. 24, 2011), http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2011/04/malawi-presidentdonates-land-for-science-university.
163. See Lu, supra note 153.
164. Li Wei, China’s Exchanges and Scholarships with Africa: History, Success and
Problems, NORRAG (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.norrag.org/en/publications/norrag-news/
online-version/the-geopolitics-of-overseas-scholarships-awards-old-and-new-providers-eastwest-north-south/detail/chinas-exchanges-and-scholarships-with-africa-history-success-andproblems.html.
165. Id.
166. See UDHR, supra note 123, art. 25(1); ICESCR, supra note 124, art. 11(1).
167. See The Human Right to Water and Sanitation, G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/64/292 (Aug. 3, 2010).
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mali, Chad and Niger. 168 Agricultural production offers one significant way to lower the likelihood of the next famine, while boosting
the health and longevity of this generation of Africans.
To meet some of these demands, China has built twenty agricultural demonstration centers throughout Africa, and regularly dispatches agronomists to advise on raising agricultural productivity. 169
In Senegal, for example, Chinese agronomists have introduced rice
cultivation techniques, and new strains of rice through a pilot program with the Senegalese Ministry of Agriculture. 170 According to
Chinese sources, three pilots set up along the Senegal River tested
two strains of rice and various cultivation techniques, which yielded
between two to three times the quantity of rice as local varieties and
techniques. 171 The Chinese then train local farmers in the new cultivation techniques, and will probably sell them seeds, perhaps at a
discounted price. China’s presence could very well double or triple
rice productions for Senegalese, but China will eventually be paid for
its efforts. But it is also important to note that this will ultimately be
a commercial enterprise. China is not doing charity work in Africa;
this is no mission civilisatrice. Rather, China hopes to develop new
markets for products it is developing; these demonstration stations
allow local scientists, farmers and officials to taste, and test, the
wares before deciding to purchase.
Access to clean drinking water likewise plagues many on the
continent. With the Sahara Desert covering nearly one-quarter of its
land, Africa is among the driest continents. Periodic droughts—
Ethiopia in the 1980s, Niger and Mali in the 2000s—have exacerbated this aridity, and led to the starvation and deaths of millions of Africans. Even in sub-Saharan Africa, clean water remains a scarce
natural resource.
168. Henry Foy, Millions Face Starvation in West Africa, Warn Aid Agencies,
GUARDIAN (June 21, 2010, 7:26 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/21/
millions-face-starvation-west-africa (noting 10 million people faced starvation in Niger,
Chad and other countries); Michael Fleshman, Millions Threatened with Starvation: UN
Appeals for Emergency Relief for Southern Africa, AFRICA RECOVERY, Sept. 2002, at 3
(noting that nearly sixteen million in seven countries were at risk in 2002); Africa Starvation
Warning, BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 1999, 10:42 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
325543.stm (describing the risk of starvation in Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sierra Leone,
Angola and the Great Lakes region in 1999).
169. See Liu & Qiu, supra note 128.
170. See Zhongguo Yuanzhu Saineijiaer Zhuanjia “Pao” Chu Shuidao Gaochan [China
Aids Senegalese Experts to Throw a High Rice Yield], ALIBABA NEWS (Nov. 23, 2009),
http://info.china.alibaba.com/detail/1007813934.html.
171. The Chinese strains produced an average of ten tons per hectare, while local strains
produced three to five tons.
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Since the first team was sent to Tanzania in 1965, Chinese
engineers have drilled some 4,000 water-wells in twenty African
countries. 172 Not every well leads inexorably to a stable water supply, yet many African villagers can thank China for relatively secure
access to water. In the early 1970s, for instance, Mauritania requested Chinese assistance in building wells. The Chinese built eighteen
wells, as well as a fifty-six kilometer piping system, to bring water to
the 800,000 inhabitants of Nouakchott. 173 Later in the 1970s, after
signing a bilateral agreement with Nigeria, China sent twenty-seven
engineers to dig dozens of wells in the northwest part of the country,
near the basin of Lake Chad. 174 Even now, Nigeria continues to welcome Chinese engineers, who have built 220 hand-drawn wells, and
seven electric wells, since 2005. 175 Under a 2004 bilateral agreement, China will build 598 wells in Nigeria, for 180 local governments spread out across all eighteen provinces, as well as in its four
administrative capitals. 176 Even in Darfur, where temperatures regularly exceed 100-degrees, Chinese peacekeepers have drilled a well
to provide water for members of the joint African Union/United Nations peacekeeping mission. 177 Finding water in such an environment is, of course, both a humanitarian and human rights concern.
E. Response to Professor James Thuo Gathii
During President Nixon’s 1971 visit to China, Nixon asked
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai about the impact of the 1789 French
Revolution. “Too early to tell,” Zhou reputedly answered, outlining
a historical horizon far longer than most Westerners would probably
accept. 178 Professor Gathii, in his response to my article, makes a
similar assessment about the human rights impact of China’s pres172. HU, supra note 141, at 194.
173. Id. at 195.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 196.
176. Id.
177. Sudan, Darfur: Chinese Peacekeepers’ Well Drilling Team, WASH NEWS AFRICA
(July 25, 2012), http://washafrica.wordpress.com/2012/07/25/sudan-darfur-chinese-peace
keepers-well-drilling-team.
178. Richard McGregor, Zhou’s Cryptic Caution Lost in Translation, FIN. TIMES (June
10, 2011, 8:03 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/74916db6-938d-11e0-922e-00144feab4
9a.html. Zhou’s response has long been interpreted in the West to “buttress China’s
reputation as a far-thinking, patient civilization.” Id. Recently, however, the historical
record has been clarified. Zhou was evidently referring to the 1968 Paris Riots, events that
unfolded just three years prior to President Nixon’s visit. Id.
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ence in Africa. 179 It is simply too soon to conclude whether China is
actually advancing the cause of human rights in Africa. While I appreciate his penetrating critique, and concur with much of what he
writes, I would like to offer three clarifications in response.
First, Professor Gathii expresses concern about the “longterm sustainability” of China’s contributions to human rights in Africa, suggesting that my analysis focuses solely on short-term improvements. But as I showed in Parts III and IV, China has worked
on African infrastructure projects for over four decades. The Tanzam
railroad suggests that projects can be at once monumental, revolutionary in their day and still functional some thirty-five years later.
True, the longevity of current projects is unknowable at the present
moment. But I would argue that the responsibility for the long-term
effects of a road, power plant, well, school or other structure cannot
be pinned solely on the Chinese side. Africans too must accept responsibility for ensuring the continued operability of these tools.
While China must train African personnel on the use and maintenance of these various projects, the onus for the long-term sustainability of these projects ultimately falls on Africa, not China. Again,
comparison with China’s recent history is helpful. China has moved
very quickly up the value chain in its manufactures over the past
three decades, not because Western companies voluntarily handed
over valuable technology and trade secrets, but because China’s laws
and regulations required transfer technology. African countries
should follow suit.
Second, Professor Gathii writes that I deploy an “extremely
low baseline to establish the effect of China’s presence in Africa.” 180
I do not disagree. Indeed, the discursive space in which I write pays
virtually no attention to the benefits of China’s presence in Africa.
By describing some of these benefits, and placing them within a wider human rights framework, I seek to challenge widely accepted verities that China is a colonizer and drain on Africa’s natural resources.
In pushing the needle ever so slightly, I hope that future treatments of
the Sino-African issues can avoid the self-serving dualism that China
is a reckless exploiter, and the West offers Africa its best hope of development. The baseline is low primarily because I am writing in a
discursive vacuum.
Third, Professor Gathii rightly points out that China’s interstate relations are statist, ignoring or overlooking civil society groups

179. See Gathii, supra note 26, at 666.
180. Id. at 667.
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and other non-state actors. 181 Since, as Gathii states, Africa’s leadership does not often act with the interests of most Africans in mind,
there is the distinct possibility that Chinese support will benefit elites,
but not the overwhelming majority of Africans. I share this concern,
and have elsewhere written about the important work that Chinese
lawyers, activists and other civil society actors do in challenging
Chinese authorities on human rights matters. 182 Yet it is undeniable
that civil society remains weak and fragmented in China. The little
influence it wields is unlikely to be felt on distant shores; authoritarian states such as China discourage challenges on their own soil, and
are unlikely to cede their monopoly on power in the foreign context.
In sum, Africans will need to ensure that China’s developmental assistance is well deployed by selecting leaders to represent their interests. Yet since few African states are fully democratic, this is an unlikely prospect. 183
CONCLUSION
China’s engagement with fifty African countries extends far
beyond aiding and abetting the least savory regimes. In the 1950s,
China first gained a foothold in the continent through small aid projects in thirty-six countries. In the past ten years, China has played
an increasingly visible role throughout the continent, across a wide
range of fields, from building schools and malaria centers to constructing roads and hydroelectric power plants. While China does
not use the banner of human rights to trumpet its rice experimentation centers, medical teams or water wells, these projects have helped
raise the living standards, and secure the fundamental human rights,
of millions of Africans. Just as China’s unique, state-centric model
of development has brought hundreds of millions of its own citizens
out of poverty, its projects in Africa promise to do the same for Africans. To be sure, China’s support for a small number of “rogue
states” has thwarted international sanctions, and Western plans to
isolate these regimes. While unfortunate, such support is largely unrepresentative of China’s Africa footprint, which covers a much
181. Id. at 677.
182. See Timothy Webster, Ambivalence and Activism: Employment Discrimination in
China, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 643 (2011).
183. See Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprisings and Their Global
Repercussions, FREEDOM HOUSE, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/
freedom-world-2012 (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (classifying six African states as “free,”
twenty-two as “partly free,” and twenty-two as “not free”).
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broader area than these conflict-ridden regimes. Perhaps it is now
time to consider whether China’s models, activities and counterexamples can teach the West something that our own decades of developmental experience, following centuries of colonialism, have failed
to illuminate.

